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Abstract
This paper tests the impact of remuneration committee independence on Chief Ex-
ecutive (CEO) pay. FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are used to assess
whether remuneration committees facilitate optimal contracting or whether CEOs
capture the pay-setting process and inﬂate their own remuneration. This panel has
a number of advantages over prior samples and, in particular, contains a more com-
prehensive assessment of non-executive directors’ independence. No evidence of a
relationship between CEO pay and director independence is found, challenging the
theory of managerial power and the received wisdom of institutional guidance.
JEL Classiﬁcation numbers: G30, J30. Key Words: CEO Compensation, Corporate
Governance, Managerial Power, Board Capture
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I. Introduction
There is widespread concern that the CEO pay-setting process is broken. With the
onset of spectacular corporate failures, particularly in the ﬁnancial services industry
where aggressive bonus schemes are commonplace, the public disquiet with executive
remuneration has reached new heights1. Yet, orthodox economic theory (optimal
contracting) posits that CEO pay is set by the board on behalf of shareholders,
attracting and motivating directors of the desired calibre without paying more than is
∗The author thanks Martin Conyon, Alistair Bruce, Sarah Wilson, Guy Callaghan (Manifest
Information Services Ltd), the anonymous referee, and participants at EARIE 2007 for helpful
comments. The author is indebted to Steve Thompson and Peter Wright for their numerous
contributions and for the generous guidance they continue to provide.
1Public outrage became violent when the house of Sir Fred Goodwin, the former CEO of Royal
Bank of Scotland (RBS), was attacked after it emerged RBS posted a record loss of £40,667m and
Sir Fred would receive a pension of £700,000 per annum. This was later reduced to a lump sum
of £2.8m and £342,500 per annum.
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necessary (Holmstrom 1979, Prendergast 1999). In light of recent events2 alternative
theories of pay determination warrant examination.
Lucian Bebchuk has developed a theory (referred to here as managerial power3)
that is consistent with the popular perception of executive remuneration (Bebchuk
et al. 2002; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, 2004). Following earlier work by Kay & Silber-
ston (1995), and Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001), Bebchuk and his co-authors have
documented a broken system producing ineﬃcient, ineﬀective and extremely gener-
ous compensation arrangements. Their central tenet is that the system is broken
because of unresolved agency problems which stem from powerful managers who are
able to capture the pay-setting process. Thus, the CEO eﬀectively sets their own
pay constrained only by an aversion to the outrage their contract generates.
Regulators are aware of the potential conﬂict of interest. In the UK, best practice
initiatives since the Cadbury Report (1992) have sought to limit executive inﬂu-
ence over the pay-setting process and strengthen the role of non-executive directors
(Greenbury 1995; Higgs 2003; Combined Code 2009). In particular, members serv-
ing on the remuneration committee, the sub-committee of the board that determines
CEO pay, are supposed to be independent in character and judgement so that they
are able to resist capture by the CEO and curtail inﬂated pay outcomes4. The re-
cent Walker review (2009) revisits the idea that a lack of remuneration committee
independence contributed to failings in the ﬁnancial service sector. An empirical
investigation of the impact of independence on CEO pay is very timely for policy-
makers.
The optimal contracting model predicts that CEO pay will not vary in any consis-
tent direction with the level of independence in the pay-setting process (Core et al.
1999). It is not that the composition of the board is irrelevant, only that sharehold-
ers control elections to the board and the remuneration committee who will produce
the optimal contract. In direct contrast, the managerial power hypothesis implies
the more inﬂuence the CEO has over the remuneration committee, the more they
will distort their pay above the optimal level. Thus a truly independent remunera-
tion committee is vital to avoid inﬂated pay outcomes under the managerial power
hypothesis, but not of central concern under standard contracting theory.
In contrast to the voluminous coverage in the business press5 the impact of inde-
pendence on pay negotiations been subject to little formal empirical investigation.
There is not consensus on the simple question of whether more independence di-
minishes CEO excess. Prior work has been hindered by limited data arising from
incomplete and opaque company disclosures. Even as companies have become more
2For example, the apparent disconnect between shareholder returns and CEO pay in high pro-
ﬁle companies such as RBS, Shell and Bellway and the possibility that bonuses arrangements
might actually have contributed to the present ﬁnancial crisis by generating myopic incentives and
encouraging excessive risk taking (Treasury Committee 2009), see http://blog.manifest.co.uk/.
3Also known as rent extraction, or board capture theory.
4Such provisions do not form part of UK company law. Rather, the adopted approach is one of
“comply or explain”; that is companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange are required by law
to either comply with the provisions or disclose any non-compliance to shareholders. See Solomon
(2007) for a review.
5See for example Guardian Special Reports.
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forthcoming with their disclosures6 prior studies have lacked a comprehensive im-
partial measure of independence. This paper exploits a dataset with several novel
elements including an objective independence assessment covering 40,455 director-
years. The sample permits detailed scrutiny of the notion of independence and its
impact on CEO pay by identifying individual CEOs with full remuneration data and
precise service dates. This enables the estimation of a dynamic pay equation that
controls for unobservable individual eﬀects. No evidence of an independence eﬀect
is found, presenting a challenge to the managerial power perspective. This result is
robust to several econometric speciﬁcations.
II. Theoretical background
The economics of executive remuneration contracts are normally understood in
the context of a principal-agent relationship whereby the manager experiences dif-
ferent incentives to the owner (Jensen & Meckling 1976). As some actions of
the manager are hidden from the principal (the moral hazard problem), the man-
ager might pursue an agenda at the owner’s expense without incurring punish-
ment from the owner (Holmstrom 1979). Further, the managerial agenda is un-
likely to be in the public interest, whereas the optimisation of shareholder value
is the basis upon which resources are allocated eﬃciently within a market econ-
omy (Tirole 2001, Weisbach 2007). The remuneration contract might alleviate these
problems by realigning the incentives of the agent with those of the principal (Jensen
& Murphy 1990, Conyon & Kuchinskas 2006). In the UK, this is achieved through a
mixture of cash bonuses, share options and other equity based incentives, which tie
the agent’s reward to the performance of the company. Thus, even where imperfect
monitoring and moral hazard prevail, a positive correlation between CEO pay and
ﬁrm performance is expected to be observed.
Measuring the magnitude of the pay-performance correlation has been the indus-
try standard for testing the ability of remuneration contracts to respond to agency
concerns. Early empirical work7 failed to ﬁnd strong evidence of a pay response to
performance (Jensen & Murphy 1990), whereas studies conducted post the increase
in stock-based compensation of the 1980s ﬁnd a much stronger relationship (Hall
& Liebman 1998). This trend has continued over the last ten years with the vari-
able component of pay now forming the majority of the total compensation package
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009). The other established determinant of CEO pay is
company size. Tosi et al. (2000) perform a meta-analysis with 137 papers on CEO
pay and conclude that ﬁrm size accounts for more than 40% of the variance in total
CEO pay while ﬁrm performance accounts for less than 5% of the variance. Rosen
(1981) articulates a marginal productivity narrative whereby the best CEOs are
sorted into the largest companies so that their superior talent generates the greatest
impact on ﬁrm value. Equally, the cost of poor executive decisions increase as the
6Due to pressure from best practice in the 1990s and formal disclosures rules post 2002.
7The empirical literature on pay-performance sensitivity is vast and a full review is not at-
tempted here. US surveys are provided by Murphy (1999), Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman (1997),
Prendergast (1999), and Jensen et al. (2004); while Bruce & Buck (2005) provide a review of the
UK literature.
3
company increases in size (Conyon & Leech 1994). Thus even small diﬀerences in
human capital can translate to very large diﬀerences in pay because of large dif-
ferences in ﬁrm size. Consistent with this view, Gabaix & Landier (2008) present
evidence that the 600% increase in CEO pay in US ﬁrms between 1980 and 2003
can be explained by the 600% increase in ﬁrm size.
Yet the managerial power perspective argues that incentive compensation, far
from being the solution to the agency problem, is a product of an unresolved agency
problem within the pay-setting process. This perspective focuses investigation on
the relationships between the CEO and the other directors sitting on the board.
CEOs are accused of inﬂating their own pay through their dominance of the pay-
setting process. There have long been concerns that CEO pay outcomes may reﬂect
an element of discretionary power. For example, the pay-size relationship might
be a product of the desire of CEOs to grow the ﬁrm beyond its optimal size in
order to extract the pecuniary and non-pecuniary beneﬁts associated with larger
ﬁrms (Cosh 1975). However, the managerial power model goes further, arguing
that hidden actions extend to the manipulation of the board enabling the CEO to
eﬀectively set their own pay.
The CEO can control the pay-setting process, by controlling nominations to the
board, through which the CEO appoints sympathetic like-minded individuals and
removes any trouble-makers8. These captured directors are more interested in ad-
vancing the CEO’s agenda than safeguarding the interests of shareholders. Bebchuk
et al. (2002) argue this is likely to be most keenly observed in the outcome of CEO
pay negotiations, where inﬂated and ineﬀective compensation arrangements are, in
their view, commonplace. With the CEO ﬁrmly in control of their own compensa-
tion, the CEO will inﬂate their pay until outrage from shareholders and business
pundits force some moderation.
The managerial power theory has stimulated a lively debate. The defence of the
traditional theories of CEO pay have not focused on reasserting the integrity and
independence of the CEO pay setting process; there is broad agreement that de-
viations from “arms-length” bargaining are likely. Yet several scholars continue to
prefer the optimal contracting model (or some variant of it), believing it to be a
more consistent with the known empirical evidence. For example, Murphy (2002)
argues that CEO pay escalated during a period which saw the introduction of cor-
porate governance reforms, including more independent boards. At a time when
managerial inﬂuence should have been declining, CEO pay was accelerating. The
sample used here shares this feature. Similarly, Thomas (2004) points to the growth
in the pay gap between CEO earnings in the US and elsewhere, during a time when
the corporate governance regime was tightening relative to the rest of the world.
Market forces seem a more natural interpretation of these trends than managerial
power, a position which Hubbard (2005) also advances. Core et al. (2004) argue
that remuneration contracts are speciﬁcally designed to limit the costs of managerial
power, principally by tying reward to ﬁrm performance with stock options. This re-
turns CEO pay outcomes towards those predicted by the optimal contracting model.
8There are clear analogies here with the paranoid dictator of an autocratic regime. Indeed,
Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) contrast corporations where shareholders retain their democratic
control rights with CEO dominated dictatorships.
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Likewise, Holmstrom (2006) maintains that the CEO is unable to inﬂate their own
remuneration far above the market rate as information pertaining to pay in other
companies of a similar size is in the public domain and readily supplied by compen-
sation consultants. Thus the practice of benchmarking circumnavigates awkward
confrontation between the CEO and the remuneration committee as both parties
defer to normal market practice. While there is an acknowledgement of Bebchuk
et al’s. anecdotal evidence linking overpayment relative to performance and man-
agerial power (Weisbach (2007) in particular credits Bebchuk et al’s. concept of
camouﬂage as a persuasive description of poor company disclosures) these authors
appear in in agreement that rigourous empirical evidence demonstrating that high
pay is result of board capture is lacking.
The potential for a CEO dictatorship is anticipated by institutional guidance in
the UK (ABI 2006). Through a series of corporate governance reforming eﬀorts
including establishing standards of ‘best practice’ (Combined Code 2009) and in-
creased engagement from institutional shareholders (Myners 2004) companies have
improved transparency in ﬁnancial reporting and accountability within the board.
With respect to board accountability the central reforming eﬀort has been directed
at strengthening the role and independence of non-executive directors (Higgs 2003).
Institutional shareholders, corporate governance agencies and the companies them-
selves all focus their attention on the issue of independence, and independence in
the remuneration committee is regarded as a key component in avoiding pay out-
comes inﬂated in favour of the CEO. This is a departure from optimal contracting
models where board capture is not a central concern. Indeed, a lack of independence
amongst some members may actually facilitate more appropriate compensation de-
cisions (Conyon & He 2004). For example, close working relationships with the
executive management team might lead to a greater understanding of the pertinent
issues facing the corporation. Therefore, while the independence of the directors is
an important determinant of pay under the managerial power model it is unlikely
to play a role under the optimal contracting model.
Prior empirical studies
Of the numerous of prior papers investigating executive remuneration, only a hand-
ful have given serious thought to the role of the non-executive director and the
remuneration committee in the pay setting process9. These are summarised in table
1 which models the CEO pay-setting process as follows:
푅푒푚푢푛푒푟푎푡푖표푛푖푗푡 = 훾푖 + 훿푗 + 훼푡 + 훽(퐼푛푠푖푑푒푟푠)푖푗푡 + 휆(퐶표푛푡푟표푙푠)푖푗푡 + 휇푖푗푡 (1)
where 훾 is an unidentiﬁed ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀect for ﬁrm i which does not vary over
time, 훿푗 is a time-invariant unobserved eﬀect speciﬁc to director j, 훼푡 is a time trend,
Insiders is a variable that measures CEO control of the pay-setting committee (such
as % insiders on the remuneration committee), Controls is a vector of controls such
9However, most of these papers did not focus on the impact of independence on the remuner-
ation committee. Rather, these papers typically explored a related topic and controlled for board
independence in their regressions.
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as performance and ﬁrm size, and 훽 and 휆 are the corresponding coeﬃcients. 훽 = 0
is consistent with optimal contracting; 훽 > 0 is consistent with managerial power.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 shows there is a lack of consensus within the empirical literature as to the
importance of the composition of the pay-setting committee in the determination
of CEO pay. Some variation in results may arise from the use of diﬀerent samples.
However, the prior studies are not very diﬀerent in their sample selection. They
use large US or UK ﬁrms from the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s and these results
are not similar by decade, or by country, or by industry. Such a range of ﬁndings
is disconcerting and suggestive of shortcomings in the econometric speciﬁcations of
prior work. This study addresses a number of the potential concerns, including
unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous variables such as prior period pay and the
accurate measurement of directors’ independence.
Studies that do not contain repeated observations of ﬁrms over time can not
control for 훾푖 (Murphy 1985). However, in addition to ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, it is likely
that there are unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects associated with the individual directors in the
sample. Some prior studies have used datasets which do not identify the individual
and so have not controlled for 훿푗
10. This has been a particular problem for prior UK
studies, as the disclosure regime permitted only the identiﬁcation of the Highest Paid
Director (HPD) (Main et al. 1996). However, the HPD does not even consistently
identify the same position as the CEO is not necessarily the highest paid director on
a pro-rata basis. In this respect, the data used here, which identiﬁes every individual
director’s precise appointment and resignation date, oﬀers a signiﬁcant advantage
over the existing literature. In order to purge both ﬁrm and individual ﬁxed eﬀects, a
new variable is created that uniquely identiﬁes the ﬁrm and the individual. The data
is then sorted on this new variable and the ﬁxed eﬀects are eliminated in regression.
There is suﬃcient empirical evidence to suspect that directors’ pay does not ad-
just immediately (Main et al. 1996; Conyon 1997; Daily et al. 1998; Conyon et
al. 2000). Pay negotiations are typically conducted with reference to the exist-
ing package rather than entirely renegotiated every year. Consequently pay from a
prior period is likely to be signiﬁcant in the determination of current pay. With a
lagged dependent variable, the use of standard ﬁxed eﬀects estimators will result in
inconsistent estimates as the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the
error term (Nickell 1981, Wooldridge 2002, Cameron & Trivedi 2005). The Gener-
alized Method of Moments (GMM) provides a framework for estimating equations
with such endogenous variables. Instrumental variables that are related to the ex-
planatory variable but not the error can be used to isolate the variation that is not
correlated with the error. Such instruments are easy to obtain in panel data because
the lagged values (beyond t-1) can be used. Arellano & Bond (1991) provide a ﬁrst-
diﬀerence estimator that uses lags of the lagged dependent variable as an instrument
for prior period pay. Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) have
enhanced the Arellano-Bond estimator to provide additional instruments. Lagged
10Individual unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects might include the director’s suitability for the speciﬁc job,
their track record, or their access to a particular network. Should any of these omitted variables
be correlated with the regressors then the estimated coeﬃcients will not be consistent (Conyon et
al. 2000).
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levels might be weak instruments for ﬁrst diﬀerences (Roodman 2006). Arellano &
Bover (1995) show that, if the original equation in levels is added to the system,
additional moment conditions can be used to increase eﬃciency. For instance, prior
period pay can be instrumented with lags of its own ﬁrst diﬀerence. The resulting
estimator developed by Blundell & Bond (1998) is known as ‘system GMM’ (as
opposed to the original ‘diﬀerenced GMM’). The two-step version of the estimator
is applied here, together with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. This
is desirable as improvements in eﬃciency can be made with the two-step estima-
tor (Arellano & Bond 1991). Studies have shown that the estimated asymptotic
standard errors in ﬁnite samples are biased downwards and consequently Arellano
& Bond (1991) do not recommend inference on the coeﬃcients when the two-step
estimator is used. However, Windmeijer (2005) has developed a correction so that
inference using these corrected standard errors is appropriate.
III. Data
The dataset used in this study was acquired from Manifest Information Services Ltd
and comprises all companies that entered the FTSE 350 Index with any ﬁnancial year
end between 31st December 1996 and 31st December 2008. To avoid survivorship
bias, companies that drop out of the index prior to 2008 are covered until the
company is wound up or taken private11. The period chosen is signiﬁcant. The data
covers a full economic cycle, with market growth until 2001, decline post 9/11 and
.com crash and then recovery before the ﬁnancial crisis. Moreover, the period under
analysis is particularly interesting given the steady ﬂow of corporate governance
reforms designed to improve the transparency and accountability of boards and
produce more eﬃcient remuneration contracts.
Variable deﬁnitions
The dependent variable is the natural log of CEO pay. This captures the expected
value of the CEO’s remuneration package for the year, adjusted to December 2008
prices. This includes salary, perquisites, annual bonuses, special payments on re-
cruitment or termination, and the value of deferred bonus awards, share options and
equity incentives (LTIPs) at their grant date. The grant date value is calculated as
one-third of face value. As the exact appointment and resignation date are identiﬁed
for each individual, this study annualises all remuneration data based on the number
of days the individual served in the year, subject to the individual serving at least
three months. This represents a signiﬁcant advantage over the prior UK literature,
that was constrained to measuring the pay of an anonymous Highest Paid Director
(HPD)12.
11Investment trusts that contained no executive directors were excluded from the sample, al-
though self-managed investment trusts were retained. Certain data items such as the return index
were obtained from Thomson Datastream.
12To determine a unique time-period for the purposes of constructing the panel, the year end of
the reporting period was used. However, if a company changed its reporting year-end it is possible
to have two reporting period ends in one calendar year. In these cases, the year series was adjusted
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An important explanatory variable for the managerial power model is the com-
position of the remuneration committee. The Greenbury Report (1995) recom-
mended that boards established a sub committee of the board, comprising solely non-
executive directors to determine executive remuneration. The Combined Code has
reinforced this recommendation suggesting that remuneration committees comprise
exclusively independent non-executive directors. The Code gives a non-exhaustive
list of potential factors that might compromise the independence of a non-executive
directors character and judgement. Such factors include: familial or material busi-
ness associations with members of the management; and length of service. The
Code expects the board to state the independence of each director and to explain
situations where they consider a director independent in light of such factors. Yet
there is an obvious temptation for boards to declare their directors as independent
even when such a diagnosis might be considered dubious. Studies that only record
companies’ statements on independence are therefore limited. However, this paper,
uses Manifest’s impartial and detailed assessments of independence in addition to
the companies’ own measure.
Manifest’s assessment of independence is a stringent measure of independence.
Over the full sample, more than 50% of companies asserted that all their non-
executive directors are independent whereas Manifest regarded only 25% of compa-
nies as fully compliant. Manifest identiﬁes whether or not the non-executive director
is a former employee, has a material business relationship, family ties, is associated
with a major shareholder, has a cross directorship or has served on the board for
in excess of nine years. In the US literature three categories for directors appear:
‘insider’; ‘aﬃliated/grey’; and ‘outsider’. Insiders are either employed by the ﬁrm,
retired from the ﬁrm or immediate family members. Aﬃliated directors are those
with a material business relationship with the ﬁrm. To aid comparability, going
forward an executive director or a non-executive director who is not independent
is classiﬁed as an ‘insider’. Therefore, the primary variable under analysis is con-
structed as the percentage of insiders serving on the remuneration committee during
the year. Another measure of interest is the composition of the whole board as the
whole board remains the ultimate authority for the functioning of the company. In-
deed, a captured board might placate shareholders by placing independent directors
on the remuneration committee to legitimise inﬂated pay arrangements. Therefore,
the percentage of insiders on the whole board will also be examined for any impact
on CEO pay.
The log of annual sales turnover is included as a proxy for company size. To
control for performance, total shareholder return (TSR) is used, as it is in the
majority of UK studies. Following Conyon & Peck (1998), TSR equals the year
change in the log of the annual return index supplied by Datastream. TSR represents
gains or losses accruing from movement in the share price as well as paid dividends.
The log of pre-tax proﬁt is included as an accounting measure of performance. Where
observations became undeﬁned due to taking the log of negative proﬁt, the log of
proﬁt was recoded as zero.
The agency literature regards ownership structure as a potentially important
determinant of CEO pay (Hart 1995). Companies with concentrated ownership may
manually to uniquely identify years.
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substitute compensation in favour of direct monitoring as a device to reduce agency
problems. Similarly, a CEO with a large equity holding faces a large ﬁnancial penalty
in the loss of ﬁrm value if they undertake non-value adding activities. CEO holdings
is the percentage of stock owned by the CEO and Outside Holdings represents the
aggregated holdings of the company’s major outside shareholders. Shareholders
who own 5% or more of the company’s equity are disclosed in the annual report and
accounts. Older CEOs may be able to command higher compensation packages on
the basis of their greater experience. It is standard to enter an age squared term
to capture reduced employment opportunities for CEOs approaching retirement.
Finally, some companies, in deﬁance of the Combined Code, combine the roles of
CEO and Chairman in the same person. Such individuals may be expected to
command greater pay packages, either representing their larger marginal impact on
ﬁrm value or their greater dominance of the boardroom.
Descriptive Statistics
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Descriptive statistics of the key variables under analysis are presented in table 2.
Quantiles are included in table 2 not just because sample means in remuneration
data are vulnerable to outliers but because it is interesting to note the trends at
the diﬀerent points in the distribution. The growth in pay at the mean over the
sample period is largely driven by growth at the higher percentiles. This growth at
the higher end of the distribution is largely driven by increased bonuses and equity
incentives, whereas salary has risen by similar amounts at all percentiles. These
trends can be seen clearly in ﬁgure 1. An optimal contracting model can interpret
these trends as an increase in the equilibrium price of CEOs over the sample period
together with the increased risk premium associated with the greater variability of
pay. From a managerial power perspective, the incentive mechanisms may have been
manipulated by CEOs to provide reward for success without penalty for failure in
absolute terms. Consistent with Gregg et al. (2005) average pay did not decline
following the market downturn post 2000. However, with the onset of the ﬁnancial
crisis, 2008 median levels are less than the prior year after adjusting for inﬂation. It
should also be noted that the panel is unbalanced hence the growth ﬁgures do not
compare exactly the same set of companies in 1996 and 2008.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 illustrates the movement of board composition over the period. While
there is little movement in total board size, boards have comprised a signiﬁcantly
greater proportion of non-executive directors, and particularly independent non-
executive directors after 1999. This reﬂects the increasing pressure for companies
to meet shareholder expectations of governance structure which are guided by the
provisions contained within the Combined Code. Speciﬁcally, boards were recom-
mended to comprise at least one-third non-executive directors and on revision of the
Code in 2003 at least half non-executive directors (excluding the Chairman). The
UK is characterised by a substantial increase in independent directors from 1995-
2008, reﬂecting the consistent adoption of the Code provisions, institutional and
investor guidelines. Both Manifest and Company own assessments identify these
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trends.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
IV. Results
Table 3 reports the estimates of ordinary least squares (OLS), ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) and
general method of moments (GMM) regressions upon the companies’ own assess-
ments of independence as well as Manifest’s assessments of directors’ independence.
For the reasons identiﬁed above the GMM regression is the preferred estimation.
The two-step version of the GMM estimator is used (xtabond2 in Stata) and the
Windmeijer (2005) correction is applied to the standard errors.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The estimated coeﬃcients on the insider variables are not consistent with the
managerial power model. If anything, a greater proportion of insiders on the board
is associated with less CEO pay not more. The composition of the remuneration
committee has no statistical impact on CEO pay. The extra independence failures
that Manifest identiﬁes as a result of their stricter application of best practice do
not change this conclusion13.
The control variables behave as expected. Past realisations of pay explain a
sizeable proportion of current pay, justifying the use of the GMM estimator. Larger
companies, as measured by the number of directors and logged sales, are associated
with greater levels of CEO pay. Total shareholder return is signiﬁcant, with a
1% increase in TSR relating to a 3%-7% increase in CEO pay. Earlier studies in
the UK failed to ﬁnd a robust positive relationship between pay and performance.
However, the increased used of equity based incentives over the last 20 years has
strengthened the association between pay and performance (Main, Bruce & Buck
1996). In addition, a 1% increase in proﬁts correlates to a roughly a 1% increase
in pay. In the OLS speciﬁcations, age is positively correlated with remuneration,
but the square of age is negative, suggesting an n-shaped relationship between that
remuneration and age14. The turning point in the predicted values with respect to
age is approximately 50.
Outside holdings aggregates the non-management related disclosed shareholdings
as published in the companies’ annual report and accounts. The reported coeﬃcients
suggest that an increase in outside holdings has a diminishing eﬀect on CEO pay.
Both the managerial power and optimal contracting theories can accommodate this
ﬁnding. Large outside ownership could be countering managerial power but may
also be acting as a direct substitute for the management function. If the managerial
power explanation is favoured then one would expect a positive relationship between
CEO holdings and pay. However, this is not the case in any of the regressions above.
Further, consistent with Conyon & Leech (1994), performing the role of Chairman
13Further econometric speciﬁcations are presented in the author’s PhD thesis, available on-
line at http://etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/666. The absence of a positive statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between insiders on the remuneration committee and CEO pay was robust to these
diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
14Age is omitted from the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions as a year increase in age only enters the
constant term when estimating within individuals over annual intervals.
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as well as being the CEO is not associated with higher levels of remuneration for
the CEO.
Further Speciﬁcations
This section explores the robustness of the absence of an insider eﬀect by explor-
ing alternative measurements of remuneration and independence. In addition to
recording the company’s opinion of independence together with an impartial inde-
pendence assessment, the sample identiﬁes each reason (there may be more than
one) why a director is not considered independent. Consequently, the component
parts of the independence assessment are explored here. Table 4 shows the reasons
for independence failures as recorded by Manifest. These reasons can be collated
into independence issues associated with a relationship to management; a business
relationship with the company; representatives of large shareholders and those who
were failed for tenure only. This is desirable as some of the failure types occur
relatively infrequently in the sample but also because interesting diﬀerences may
exist between diﬀerent types of independence failure. An independence issue arising
from a relationship with management may be considered to be more compromising
than length of service alone. Indeed, the Combined Code (2003) provision that an
independence issue may arise if a director has served on the board for nine or more
years is controversial15. Companies often maintain that tenure alone is not a genuine
independence issue. Indeed, the Association of Investment Trust Companies’ Code
of Corporate Governance (2003) does not recognise tenure as an independence issue.
It is also important to distinguish directors who are, or who represent, major share-
holders from insiders. Representatives of major shareholders are not regarded as
independent directors under best practice guidelines but one would not expect these
directors to be less vulnerable to managerial capture. Indeed, outside shareholders
have a direct pecuniary incentive to ensure pay arrangements are not excessively
generous.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
It may also be possible that some elements of remuneration are easier to inﬂate
then others. Indeed, Bebchuk & Fried (2004) suggest that CEOs target the more
complex elements so to minimise shareholder and public outrage. Thus we may
expect to see a greater insider eﬀect on total remuneration or emoluments which
are less transparent than salary. Therefore, in addition to reporting the component
parts of remuneration, table 5 uses salary, emoluments and total remuneration as
three diﬀerent measures of pay.
Table 5 does not ﬁnd support for a managerial power model. The only suggestion
of an insider eﬀect is between the number of directors on the remuneration committee
who enjoy a material business relationship with the company and CEO salary using
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. Here, an extra insider is worth approximately 3% of
salary. However, upon controlling for prior period pay, this relationship does not
survive. Further, there is no statistically robust relationship between emoluments or
total remuneration and any of the insider variables, where, under a managerial power
15The reason the Code identiﬁes nine years is that directors are proposed for re-election once
every three years and it is thought that three full terms may compromise the directors’ impartiality.
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model, one might expect a stronger relationship due to their greater complexity.
Taken together, the results can only be reconciled with the managerial power
model if independence has no role in determining the extent to which CEOs can
capture the pay setting process. Perhaps, the remuneration committee is always
captured despite the reforming eﬀorts to increase independence on the board. How-
ever, such a view is not consistent with evidence arising from in-depth studies of the
board and the role of the non-executive directors (Higgs 2003; Roberts et al. 2005).
While it remains unclear exactly how important independence is relative to other
factors such as prior experience, there is consensus that independence is a relevant
characteristic in shaping the directors’ contributions. Thus the most plausible ex-
planation for these results is that, by and large, CEO compensation is a tool used
by companies to mitigate agency problems, rather than the product of unresolved
agency problems and eﬀorts by the CEO to capture the pay-setting process.
It should be stressed that this does not imply that independent non-executive
directors are redundant in the eﬀective operation of boards. The increase in inde-
pendent directors may have greatly beneﬁted companies and their shareholders over
a whole range of corporate decisions. Evidence has emerged that CEOs with more
independent directors are less able to resist dismissal in light of poor returns for
shareholders (Gregory-Smith et al. 2009). However, on the issue of CEO pay alone,
there is no evidence here that independent directors have been successful or have
even been trying to curtail CEO pay.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Robustness Checks
The accurate measurement of the value of executive equity incentives is an important
issue. The approach used here follows the practice in the remuneration consultancy
industry (MM & K Ltd 2007) and calculates equity incentives as one third of their
face value16. Studies such as Main et al. (1996) have applied an option evaluation
methodology such as Black & Scholes (1973) or a binominal method (Cox et al.
1979). These models generate a theoretical price for an option grant based on: the
company’s share price at grant date, share price volatility, and dividend yield; the
exercise period and price; and the risk free rate. Under new international accounting
regulations (IFRS-2 Share Based Payments) these methods are used in the pricing of
options in ﬁnancial statements. However, the Black-Scholes values were not readily
available in our sample and the cost in collecting the required inputs for the whole
sample was prohibitive.
Further, both the Black-Scholes and binominal approaches are problematic. They
assume the underlying asset returns follow the normal distribution (i.e. the under-
lying asset prices are distributed lognormally) which is not always the case and his-
torical measures of price volatility must used to estimate future volatility. Moreover,
there are no individual risk parameters in these valuation methodologies. Murphy
(1999) shows how option valuations are sensitive to even small variations in the
16Consultants diﬀer on the denominator to face value. Hewitt New Bridge Street uses face/5
for options and face/2 for LTIPs. PricewaterhouseCoopers use face/3 for options and face/2 for
LTIPs.
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executive’s aversion to risk. Further, Hall & Murphy (2000) describe how the stan-
dard methods evaluate the cost of the option to the ﬁrm, the value of which may
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the value to which an undiversiﬁed executive would
place on his non-tradable option. A potential solution is given in Hall & Murphy
(2002) where a certainty equivalence approach is developed to derive for what price
an executive would swap their incentives. However, this method requires assump-
tions about each executive’s preference for risk and their non ﬁrm-related wealth.
This information was not available.
In addition, none of the standard models consider the impact of performance con-
ditions. Performance conditions reduce the probability of vesting and therefore the
present expected value of the incentive but to what extent is unclear. Performance
conditions vary such that ideally, the vesting conditions on each grant would be
considered separately. Bruce et al. (2003) demonstrate how producing a truly ob-
jective estimate of the impact of performance conditions on present expected value
is an almost impossible task, particularly when vesting depends on the performance
of company peers. To complicate matters further, Bebchuk et al. (2006) provide
evidence for the opportunistic timing of option grants and Bebchuk & Fried (2004)
identify the potential for opportunistic timing on exercise. Opportunistic timing
would bias the value of any equity incentive calculated using the aforementioned
pricing methods. In light of such uncertainty, Conyon & Murphy (2000)’s arbitrary
discount of 20% when a performance condition is present, does not seem unreason-
able.
Whilst taking a third of the face value may appear a crude measure it provides a
good estimation of a share option’s fair value. As a robustness check, 70 companies
were randomly selected and the Black-Scholes value for the CEO equity grants were
manually calculated from the inputs disclosed in the notes to the companies’ ﬁnancial
statements for the 2005-2008 year ends. Table 6 shows that the face/3 method
provides a good approximation of a fair value of an option grant. Although the
mean diﬀerence between the face/3 and the Black-Scholes values are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, face/3 captures 97% of the variation in Black-Scholes measure.
In the Black-Scholes formula, LTIPs are valued at face value due to the zero exercise
price. Therefore, the face/3 captures all the variation of the Black-Scholes measure
but at one third of the value. Yet taking one-third of the face value for LTIPs is
reasonable as UK LTIPs require the satisfaction of performance conditions over the
vesting period. By global standards, these performance conditions are demanding.
Full vesting typically requires TSR in the upper quartile or even a top 10% ﬁnish
relative to a peer group or market index and no vesting occurs if performance is
below median, with straight line vesting between the median and the top threshold.
Thus, on the assumption that every ﬁnishing rank is equally likely, the expected
value from vesting is approximately one-third. Consequently, the face/3 measure
remains sensible for LTIPs given the presence of performance conditions. Table
6 conﬁrms that repeating the main regressions of table 3 on the small sample of
Black-Scholes values, makes no material diﬀerence as to whether one uses the face/3
measure or the Black-Scholes value of equity incentives.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
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V. Conclusion
This paper clariﬁes whether or not more independent directors in the pay-setting
process reduces CEO pay. Prior empirical research has failed to reach consensus
on this issue but the sample here permits more robust estimation. After control-
ling for the standard determinants of CEO pay, together with individual and ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects and prior realisations pay, this study fails to ﬁnd any evidence that an
increase in independent non-executive directors in the pay-setting process reduces
CEO pay. There is no correlation between CEO pay and the percentage of insiders
on the board. Nor is there a correlation between CEO pay and the percentage of
insiders on the remuneration committee. These results are in agreement with recent
research by Conyon, Core & Guay (2011) who also ﬁnd no evidence to support the
managerial power model17. The ﬁndings here are robust to diﬀerent constructions
of the dependent variable and remuneration committee independence. This con-
clusion challenges the theory of managerial power as well as the prevailing wisdom
of institutional guidance. If CEO pay remains a concern going forward, academics
and policy makers would do better to focus their attention on matters other than
independence in the pay-setting process.
Figures and Tables
17Conyon et al. (2011) ﬁnd no evidence that stronger governance provisions in Europe relative
to the US, result in lower CEO pay outcomes for European CEOs after adjusting for the smaller
amounts of risk contained within European CEOs’ service contracts. Risk-adjusting pay explains
approximately half of the diﬀerence in pay between US and European CEOs.
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Figure 1: CEO Remuneration 1996-2008
15
Figure 2: Board Composition 1996-2008
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Table 1: Empirical literature
Study Sample Estimator Dependent Principal Insider 훽 Comment
Variable Variable
Conyon & 1500 US ﬁrms FE CEO total % insiders -0.048 No insider eﬀect
Kuchinskas (1998-2003) remuneration on Rem Com (0.079) No support for managerial power
Bonet & 504 UK plcs RE Director No. insiders 0.163** Positive insider eﬀect
Conyon (1999-2002) Emoluments on Rem Com (2.54) Tentative support for managerial power
Conyon 455 US ﬁrms OLS CEO total % insiders 0.04 No insider eﬀect
& He (1998-2001) remuneration on Rem Com (1.27) Optimal contracting model preferred
Anderson 110 US ﬁrms FE Director % insiders 0.131 No insider eﬀect
& Bizjak (1985-1998) remuneration on Rem Com (0.47)
Core et al. 205 US ﬁrms OLS CEO total No. gray directors 0.009** Positive insider eﬀect.
(1982-1984) remuneration on Rem Com (3.19)
Newman 161 US ﬁrms OLS CEO total =1 if insider inﬂuence 0.0007** No downside risk if insider dominated
& Mozes (1991-1993) remuneration and falling market value (-3.561) Suggestive of managerial power
Benito 211 UK plcs FE CEO Emoluments =1 if separate Rem Com 0.0063 No support for managerial power
& Conyon (1985-1994) (0.23)
Conyon 94 UK plcs FE HPD Salary No. Outsiders 0.692** More independence increases pay
& Peck (1991-1994) + bonus on Rem Com (2.91)
Conyon 213 UK plcs GMM HPD Emoluments Adopted a rem com -0.026** Adoption of Rem Com lowers HPD pay
(1988-1993) (-2.13)
Notes:
1. The dependent variables were measured in logs and hence the reported coeﬃcients describe the percentage increase in the dependent variable for a
unit increase in the explanatory variable. Core et al. (1999) did not log the dependent variable but the table above converts their reported coeﬃcient
at the median.
2. T-statistics in the parentheses; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; * Signiﬁcant at 10%.
3. Rem Com = Remuneration Committee; HPD = Highest Paid Director; FE= Fixed Eﬀects; RE=Random Eﬀects; OLS = Ordinary Least Squares;
GMM = Generalised Method of Moments.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Key Variables N Mean SD Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
CEO Remuneration
Salary £000푠 5,788 412 234 168 250 364 514 721
Growth 96-08 52.13% 76.69% 63.73% 43.24% 45.35% 61.12%
Emoluments £000푠 5,836 1,063 1,913 233 368 608 1,099 2,146
Growth 96-08 193.03% 143.86% 127.14% 175.36% 217.19% 269.96%
Total Rem £000푠 5,847 1,218 2,244 240 405 699 1,274 2,418
Growth 96-08 284.03% 178.19% 172.11% 212.75% 250.44% 347.72%
Board
Size 5,198 8.73 2.88 6 7 8 10 12
No. Execs 5,198 3.98 1.83 2 3 4 5 6
No. NEDs 5,198 4.75 2.05 3 3 4 6 7
% insiders (C) 5,198 0.578 0.209 0.333 0.428 0.545 0.667 1
% insiders (M) 5,198 0.648 0.200 0.4 0.5 .625 0.778 1
Remuneration Committee
Size 5,198 1.88 1.75 0 0 2 3 4
% insiders (C) 5,198 0.421 0.477 0 0 0 1 1
% insiders (M) 5,198 0.480 0.463 0 0 0.333 1 1
Control variables
TSR 5,110 0.058 0.566 -0.489 -0.132 0.115 0.324 0.541
Sales £푀푠 5,835 2,600 9,350 44.5 144 543 1,910 5,950
Proﬁt £푀푠 5,255 283 1,640 -23.3 8.23 45.80 178 603
CEO age 5,847 51.53 6.89 42.36 47.00 52.03 56.53 56.92
CEO Holdings % 4,595 2.29 7.50 0.004 0.015 0.700 0.514 4.810
CH&CEO % 5,847 10.8 3.10 0 0 0 0 1
Outside Holdings 4,595 31.65 18.39 8.660 16.90 29.73 44.60 56.88
Notes:
1. Emoluments comprises of salary, perks, bonuses, exercised options or equity incentives and any other cash payments received during the year.
Total Remuneration is the same as emoluments but takes the grant date value of options and equity incentives instead of the exercised value. Total
remuneration is the preferred measure of pay as it represents the expected value of the CEO’s remuneration package for the year. All monetary values
are annualised and expressed in December 2008 prices.
2. % insiders (C) denotes companies’ own assessment of independence and (M) denotes Manifest’s impartial assessment of independence.
3. Remuneration committee insiders are predominately non-executive directors who are not deemed independent. Less than 1% of remuneration
committee members are executive directors, consistent with UK institutional guidance.
4. TSR = Total shareholder return, Execs = Executive directors, NEDs = Non-executive directors, Proﬁt = Proﬁt before tax, CH&CEO = 1 where the
roles of Chairman and Chief Executive are performed by the same person, Outside Holdings = the aggregated disclosed holdings of non-management
related major shareholders. Please refer to section III. for further details.
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Table 3: Company Assessments vs. Manifest Assessments
Ln Total CEO Pay OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM
% Insiders on the Board
Companies’ Assessments -0.291** 0.023 -0.131
(-2.79) (0.20) (-1.54)
Manifest’s Assessments -0.237** -0.067 -0.115
(-2.34) (-0.61) (-1.48)
% Insiders on the Remuneration Committee
Companies’ Assessments 0.013 0.017 -0.003
(0.30) (0.46) (-0.09)
Manifest’s Assessments 0.027 0.030 0.001
(0.65) (0.79) (0.01)
Pay(푡−1) 0.2684** 0.2728**
(4.70) (4.82)
TSR 0.069** 0.060** 0.032* 0.068** 0.060** 0.032*
(3.26) (3.18) (1.67) (3.22) (3.15) (1.67)
Ln Sales 0.181** 0.071** 0.121** 0.179** 0.070** 0.119**
(13.23) (3.21) (7.92) (12.75) (3.20) (7.72)
Ln Proﬁt 0.006** 0.007** 0.007** 0.006** 0.008** 0.007**
(2.46) (3.31) (3.37) (2.46) (3.36) (3.37)
No. Execs 0.022** 0.010 0.019** 0.019** 0.013 0.018**
(2.24) (0.92) (2.44) (2.02) (1.38) (2.46)
No. NEDs 0.110** 0.031** 0.076** 0.115** 0.029** 0.077**
(9.99) (2.24) (6.09) (10.74) (2.24) (6.33)
Committee Size 0.036** -0.003 0.010 0.037** -0.003 0.010
(3.08) (-0.20) (1.18) (3.21) (-0.21) (1.19)
Outside Holdings -0.002** -0.000 -0.001* -0.002** -0.000 -0.001*
(-2.17) (-0.51) (-1.68) (-2.21) (-0.50) (-1.66)
Chairman & CEO -0.168** -0.079 -0.164** -0.078
(-2.20) (-1.27) (-2.15) (-1.26)
Age 0.063** 0.064**
(2.25) (2.29)
Age2 -0.001** -0.001**
(-2.42) (-2.45)
CEO Holdings -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(-0.35) (0.13) (-1.30) (-0.34) (0.16) (-1.29)
N 3,630 3,630 3,090 3,630 3,630 3,090
Notes:
T-statistics are provided in the parenthesises. The constant term and time dummies were
included but omitted from the output. With respect to the GMM regressions, for unbiasedness
the deeper lags of pay that were used to instrument prior period pay must be uncorrelated
with the error. This is tested with the Hansen J statistic. Another potential bias might arise
from second order autocorrelation in the ﬁrst diﬀerenced errors. Both these diagnostic tests
are satisﬁed (Hansen J 휒2 = 37.49, 푃푟표푏 > 휒2 = 0.708; No AR(2)in ﬁrst diﬀerences 푧 = −0.22,
푃푟표푏 > 푧 = 0.828).
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Table 4: Independence Violations 1996-2008
NED-years
Total NED-years 40,455
Failed by Company 11,620
Failed by Manifest 17,871
Relationship with Management 1,409
Prior Executive Director 1,187
Family relationship 262
Business Relationship 2,875
Material Business Relationship 1,426
Cross Directorship 84
Professional/Consultancy Services 546
Received fees other than for service as NED 940
Tenure (≥ nine years) 6,260
Only Tenure 4,765
Major Shareholders 1,616
Outside major shareholder 1,396
Notes:
Manifest conducts independence assessments on an annual basis. A individual director may be
independent in one year and violate independence in another. In any one year, a director may
fail for more than one reason. In the earlier years of the sample, the reason for independence
failure was not recorded.
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Table 5: Independence Assessment Breakdown
FE GMM
a b c a b c
Independence Issue
Related to Management -0.035 -0.081 -0.070 -0.007 -0.022 -0.040
(-1.07) (-0.62) (-0.67) ( -0.24) (-0.31) (-0.54)
Business Relationship 0.027** 0.001 0.050 0.017 0.050 0.023
(2.90) (0.13) (1.59) (0.97) (1.21) (0.80)
Tenure Only -0.026 0.005 -0.038 0.004 0.042 -0.019
(-1.43) (0.13) (-1.08) (0.25) (1.22) (-0.68)
Outside Shareholder -0.021 0.040 -0.012 -0.018 0.045 0.036
(-0.44) (0.51) (-0.22) (-0.67) (0.89) (0.98)
Pay푡−1 0.136** 0.200** 0.271**
(2.68) (4.58) (4.93)
TSR -0.002 0.132** 0.059** -0.005 0.119** 0.032*
(-0.10) (5.38) (3.09) (-0.39) (4.41) (1.67)
Ln Sales 0.049** 0.064** 0.070** 0.128** 0.115** 0.121**
(3.47) (2.76) (3.19) (9.61) (7.80) (7.94)
Ln Proﬁt 0.003** 0.013** 0.008** 0.001 0.010** 0.008**
(2.25) (5.62) (3.38) (0.64) (4.81) (3.74)
No. Execs 0.003 -0.015 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.014**
(0.58) (-1.43) (1.29) (1.47) (0.27) (2.05)
No. NEDs 0.029** 0.017 0.031** 0.048** 0.079** 0.079**
(3.82) (1.30) (2.46) (8.00) (7.53) (6.55)
Committee Size -0.027** 0.014 -0.004 0.006 0.009 0.011
(-2.41) (0.73) (-0.35) (1.08) (0.84) (1.27)
Outside Holdings 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001**
(0.03) (-0.37) (-0.45) (-1.68) (-0.31) (-1.91)
CEO Holdings 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.002* -0.003 -0.003
(0.22) (1.27) (0.30) (-1.66) (-1.25) (-1.48)
N 3,606 3,629 3,630 3,069 3,088 3,090
Groups 1,063 1,072 1,072 935 943 943
Instruments 61 71 71
Hansen J 휒2 41.79 34.62 38.00
푃푟표푏 > 휒2 0.140 0.815 0.688
No AR(2) in -0.53 1.05 -0.14
ﬁrst diﬀerences 0.595 0.295 0.892
Notes:
1. a) salary; b) emoluments; c) total remuneration. Emoluments comprises of salary, perks,
bonuses, exercised options or equity incentives and any other cash payments received during
the year. Total Remuneration is the same as emoluments but takes the grant date value of
options and equity incentives instead of the exercised value.
2. Robust t-statistics in the parenthesises.
3. Time dummies and constant included.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
N Mean S.d Median Mean Diﬀ. Corr Coef.
(T-stat) (R-squared)
Share Options
Face/3 £000푠 84 645 1,933 236 158 1.24
Black-Scholes £000푠 84 803 2,413 305 (3.01) (99.9%)
LTIPs
Face/3 £000푠 195 571 2,459 176 956 2.66
Black-Scholes £000푠 195 1,528 6,543 469 (3.27) (100%)
OLS FE GMM
% Board Insiders 0.133 -0.001 0.425 0.238 -0.269 -0.096
(-0.42) (0.00) (1.10) (0.67) (-1.02) (-0.29)
% Committee Insiders -0.332** -0.257* 0.002 -0.026 0.055 -0.021
(-2.56) (-1.82) (0.02) (-0.10) (0.55) (-0.12)
Pay(푡−1) 0.384* 0.229
(1.63) (0.96)
TSR -0.100 -0.048 0.106 0.160 0.094 -0.022
(-0.68) (-0.31) (0.99) (0.62) (0.82) (-0.11)
Ln Sales 0.274** 0.255** -0.377 -0.602 0.202** 0.222**
(7.23) (6.12) (-0.88) (-1.38) (2.90) (3.42)
Ln Proﬁt 0.006 0.006 0.013* 0.013 0.006 0.009
(0.38) (0.33) (1.68) (1.17) (1.02) (0.93)
No. EDs -0.033 -0.044* -0.012 -0.026 0.001 -0.034
(-1.51) (-1.82) (-0.64) (-1.06) (0.06) (-1.36)
No. NEDs 0.009 0.001 0.040* 0.004 -0.002 0.014
(0.52) (0.02) (1.65) (0.14) (-0.22) (0.77)
Committee Size 0.014 0.019 -0.019 0.007 0.034** 0.025
(0.76) (0.86) (-0.98) (0.27) (2.66) (1.48)
Outside Holdings 0.001 0.001 0.008* 0.005 -0.001 0.001
(0.06) (0.01) (1.70) (1.08) (-0.17) (0.30)
Chairman & CEO -0.097 0.029 0.258 0.119
(-0.38) (0.11) (1.31) (0.38)
Age -0.045 -0.081
(-0.40) (-0.61)
Age2 0.001 0.001
(0.66) (0.83)
CEO Holdings -0.003 -0.003 -0.025 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013
(-0.18) (-0.15) (-1.48) (-0.44) (-1.50) (-0.76)
2006 -0.147 -0.057 -0.230** -0.171 -0.103 -0.067
(-1.34) (-0.49) (-2.12) (-1.43) (-0.97) (-0.59)
2007 -0.007 -0.045 -0.017 -0.110 0.005 0.047
(-0.08) (-0.44) (-0.25) (-1.14) (0.08) (0.47)
N 166 166 166 166 95 95
Firms 69 69 52 52
R-squared 0.511 0.445 0.223 0.142
Notes:
Let 퐺 be the number of shares granted, 푆 be the share price at grant date; 푋 the exercise price;
푟 the risk-free rate; 휎 share price volatility; 푇 time until expiry; and 푁() the standard normal
cumulative distribution function. The Black-Scholes value above (adjusted for continuous div-
idend yields) equals 퐺 ∗ (푒−푟푡(퐹푁(푑1)−푋푁(푑2))) where 퐹 = 푆푒(푟−푞)푇 , 푑(1) = ln(퐹/푋)+(휎2)푇
휎
√
푇
and 푑(2) = 푑(1) − 휎
√
푇 . Face/3 is simply 퐺∗푆3 . The inputs were taken as disclosed in the
companies’ notes to the ﬁnancial statements within the 2005-2008 annual report and accounts.22
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